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The	  First	  Encounter	  	  
Framing	  Research	  Collaboration	  
Through	  Screens	  Jane	  Bjørn	  Vedel	  	  
Much	   work	   in	   Science	   and	   Technology	   Studies	   (STS)	   assumes	   that	  
scientists	   enter	   into	   research	   collaborations	  as	   entities	   characterized	  
by	  difference.	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  in	  order	  to	  collaborate	  these	  differen-­‐
ces	  must	  be	  aligned.	   In	   this	  paper,	   I	   investigate	   the	   intriguing	  role	  of	  
difference	  in	  collaboration	  by	  looking	  at	  an	  empirical	  case	  of	  research	  
collaboration	  between	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company	  and	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  
research	  organization.	  The	  case	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  same-­‐
ness	   in	   collaboration	   is	   always	  necessary	  and,	   consequently,	  whether	  
difference	  as	  such	  is	  a	  hindrance	  to	  research	  collaboration.	  I	  conclude	  
the	  paper	  by	  suggesting	  that	  if	  collaboration	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  held	  back	  by	  
dissimilarities	  this	  suggests	  a	  need	  to	  rethink	  the	  dynamics	  of	  science-­‐
industry	  relations.	  
Introduction	  In	   recent	   years,	   research	   collaboration	  between	   academic	   and	   cor-­‐porate	  scientists	  has	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  policy	  makers	  as	  well	  as	  research	  managers	  in	  academia	  and	  industry.	  Often,	  both	  in	  public	  research	  policies	  and	  in	  university	  and	  company	  strategies,	  science-­‐industry	   collaboration	  has	  been	  presented	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	  advancing	  science	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  society	  as	  well	  as	   for	  the	  invol-­‐ved	  collaborators.	  The	  same	  policies	  and	  strategies,	  however,	  often	  emphasize	   that	   science-­‐industry	   collaboration	   is	   difficult	   and	   de-­‐manding	   due	   to	   inherent	   and	   often	   incommensurable	   differences	  between	   the	   respective	   goals	   and	  processes	  of	   academia	   and	   indu-­‐stry.	  In	   the	   literature	   on	   research	   collaboration	   in	   Science	   and	   Tech-­‐nology	  Studies	  (STS),	  it	  is	  often	  assumed	  that	  research	  collaboration	  
requires	  some	  kind	  of	  alignment	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  culture,	  theory	  and	   practice	   that	   scientists	   bring	   into	   collaboration	   (Knorr	   Cetina	  1999;	   Fujimura	   1987,	   1996;	   Galison	   1997;	   Stengers	   1997,	   2000).	  Consequently,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   overcome	   these	   differences	  has	   been	  widely	   studied,	   and	   a	   variety	   of	   answers	   have	   been	   pro-­‐posed.	  For	  instance,	  Peter	  Galison	  suggests	  that	  scientists’	  diverging	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  can	  be	  coordinated	  locally	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  homogenizing	  global	  differences	  between	  them	  (Galison	  1997:	  783).	  In	  what	  he	  calls	  local	  “trading	  zones”,	  subcultures	  of	  physicists,	  for	   example,	   invent	   specific	   rules	   of	   exchange	   and	  detailed	   contact	  languages	   that	   temporarily	   allow	   them	   to	   conform	   to	   a	   common	  cause	   (ibid.).	   In	   Joan	   Fujimura’s	   work	   alignment	   is	   not	   related	   to	  particular	   “zones”	  but	  rather	   to	  on-­‐going	  negotiation	  and	  construc-­‐tion	  of	  standards	  (Fujimura	  1987,	  1996).	  She	  suggests	  that	  the	  mak-­‐ing	   of	   a	   “doable”	   problem	   is	   related	   to	   endless	   “articulation	  work”	  and	   alignment	   around	   so-­‐called	   “standardized	   packages”	   of	   theory	  and	  methods	  (Fujimura	  1996:	  187-­‐200).	  Karin	  Knorr	  Cetina	  is	  inter-­‐ested	   in	   the	   wider	   epistemological	   and	   cultural	   mechanisms	   that	  hold	   scientific	   communities	   together.	   She	   suggests	   that	   scientists	  align	   differences	  within	   “epistemic	   cultures”,	   where	   particular	   cul-­‐tural	  arrangements	  decide	  what	  can	  be	  known	  in	  a	  given	  field.	  Con-­‐sequently,	  collaboration	  within	  a	  culture	  is	  easier	  than	  collaboration	  between	  cultures	  (Knoor	  Cetina	  1999).	  Isabelle	  Stengers	  has	  a	  simi-­‐lar	  interest	  in	  what	  links	  scientists	  and	  suggests	  that	  linking	  is	  only	  possible	  through	  interest.	  To	  interest	  a	  scientist	  in	  something	  is	  not	  easy,	   however,	   but	   requires	   that	   the	   scientist	   thoroughly	   tests	   the	  proposed	  hypothesis,	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  will	  return	  in	  the	  discussion.	  Together	   these	  examples	   from	   the	   literature	  on	   collaboration	   raise	  the	   intriguing	   question	   of	   how	   to	   analyse	   the	   role	   of	   difference	   in	  collaboration	  between	  academic	  and	  industrial	  scientists.	  	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  study	  the	  nature	  of	  difference	  and	  sameness	  in	  col-­‐laboration.	  I	  use	  an	  empirical	  case	  to	  explore	  this:	  a	  research	  collab-­‐oration	  between	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  in	  Florida,	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  research	  organization	   and	  Lundbeck,	   a	  Danish	  pharmaceutical	   company.	  My	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interest	   in	   this	   particular	   collaboration	  developed	  during	  my	   field-­‐work	  in	  Lundbeck	  from	  2009	  to	  2011.	  Often,	  this	  collaboration	  was	  debated	   among	   research	   managers	   in	   Lundbeck	   as	   an	   example	   of	  some	  of	   the	  challenges	  that	  arise	   from	  collaboration	  with	  scientists	  in	  “academia”	  (as	  we	  shall	  see,	  what	  belongs	  to	  academia	  and	  what	  belongs	   to	   industry	   is	   contested	   in	   this	   case,	  where	   scientists	   hold	  positions	  at	  universities	  while	  working	  in	  industry).	  Also,	  there	  was	  some	   ambiguity	   as	   to	   whether	   this	   particular	   collaboration	   was	   a	  success	  or	  not.	  Although	  the	  first	  encounter	  with	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  had	  brought	   out	  more	   differences	   than	   compromises	   between	   the	   two	  research	  groups,	  it	  nonetheless	  led	  to	  a	  long-­‐term	  collaboration	  that	  ran	   from	   2007	   to	   2011.	   In	   my	   account,	   I	   use	   Deleuze’s	   notion	   of	  “screens”	  (1993)	  to	  identify	  conceptual	  filters	  that	  frame	  knowledge,	  interaction	   and	   practice	   in	   particular	   ways.	   This	   allows	   me	   to	   ex-­‐plore	   how	   scientists	   from	   Lundbeck	   interpreted	   the	   first	   meeting	  with	   the	   scientists	   from	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   and	  how	   they	   constructed	  themselves	  as	  scientists	  in	  relation	  to	  them.	  	  	  The	   following	   account	   is	   based	   on	   an	   ethnographic	   study	   of	   this	  collaboration	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Lundbeck	  scientists	  and	  research	  
managers.	  My	  analysis	  takes	  its	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  a	  description	  of	  the	   first	  meeting	  between	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   and	  Lundbeck.	   I	   did	  not	  attend	  this	  meeting.	  Instead,	  I	  participated	  in	  internal	  meetings	  and	  discussions	  at	  Lundbeck	  that	  followed	  in	  the	  years	  during	  which	  the	  collaboration	  ran.	  My	  account	  of	  the	  meeting	  is	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  the	  research	  managers	  from	  Lundbeck,	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  first	  meeting.	  Therefore,	  what	  I	  present	  in	  the	  following	  is	  a	  retelling	  of	  their	  accounts	  of	  what	  took	  place	  during	  the	  meeting.	  	  	  	  	  First,	   I	   introduce	   the	   encounter	   between	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   and	  Lundbeck	  and	  describe	  how	  I	  intend	  to	  develop	  and	  use	  “screens”	  as	  analytical	  device	  for	  my	  study	  of	  research	  collaboration.	  Then	  I	  iden-­‐tify	  two	  types	  of	  screens	  that	   framed	  the	  first	  meeting	  between	  the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   and	   Lundbeck:	   an	   industrialist/scientist	   screen	   and	   a	  scientist/scientist	  screen.	  I	  give	  examples	  of	  screen	  changing.	  Finally	  I	   consider	   what	   we	   learn	   about	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   screen	   from	   the	  
analysis	  and	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  “screen-­‐mediated	  collabora-­‐tion”	   for	   thinking	   more	   generally	   about	   the	   dynamics	   of	   science-­‐industry	  relations.	  
The	  Meeting	  In	   2007,	   five	   research	   managers	   from	   Lundbeck	   travelled	   to	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  in	  Jacksonville,	  Florida.	  The	  trip	  had	  the	  purpose	  of	  dis-­‐cussing	  opportunities	  for	  future	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Neuroscience	  Research	   department	   at	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic.	   This	   included	   finding	   out	  whether	  the	  scientists	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  were	  working	  on	  research	  questions	  of	  potential	   interest	   to	  Lundbeck.	   If	   this	   turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	   case,	   the	   research	   managers	   were	   interested	   in	   formulating	   a	  joint	  research	  project.	  For	  some	  time,	  they	  had	  been	  searching	  for	  a	  “strategic	  alliance”	  with	  a	  group	  of	  “academics”	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	  neurodegenerative	  diseases.	  In	  their	  search,	  they	  had	  scrutinized	  the	   scientific	   literature	   on	   disorders	   in	   the	   central	   nervous	   system	  and	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  had	  caught	  their	  attention.	  They	  had	  noticed,	  for	  instance,	   that	   the	   names	   of	   several	   scientists	   from	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	  appeared	  in	  connection	  with	  key	  discoveries	  concerning	  Alzheimer’s	  and	  Parkinson’s	   disease.	   Looking	   further	   into	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic’s	   as-­‐sets	   and	   organization,	   they	   also	   noticed	   that	  Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists	  had	  built	  up	  a	   strong	   toolbox	   for	   investigating	  particular	  biological	  mechanisms	   related	   to	   Alzheimer’s	   disease,	   including	   transgenic	  animal	   models.	   The	   research	   managers	   now	   saw	   opportunities	   in	  getting	   access	   to	   these	   technologies	   and	   investigating	   new	   ideas	  with	   them.	   The	   Mayo	   Clinic	   seemed	   to	   be	   an	   interesting	   alliance	  partner	   that	   would	   potentially	   help	   the	   research	   managers	   make	  important	  future	  decisions	  about	  research.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   finding	   out	   whether	   there	   were	   good	   reasons	   for	  collaborating	  with	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic,	  the	  meeting	  also	  had	  the	  purpose	  of	   getting	   a	   sense	   of	  what	   it	  would	   be	   like	   to	  work	  with	   scientists	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  impression	  of	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic,	   the	   head	   of	   research	   in	   Lundbeck	   had	   gathered	   a	   group	   of	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experienced	  and	  scientifically	  strong	  managers.	  Besides	  the	  head	  of	  research,	  the	  group	  consisted	  of	  the	  divisional	  director	  of	  neurobio-­‐logical	  research,	  a	  department	  manager	  within	  the	  same	  area,	  a	  sen-­‐ior	  scientist	  and	  a	  business	  developer.	  According	  to	  my	  interviews,	  the	  group	  of	  research	  managers	  from	  Lundbeck	  were	  not	  exactly	  sure	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  arrangement	  they	  would	   prefer	   to	   set	   up	  with	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic.	   They	   had	   not,	   for	   in-­‐stance,	   defined	   a	   specific	   research	   project	   that	   they	   would	   try	   to	  convince	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists	   to	   work	   on.	   Rather,	   they	   had	  made	   a	   list	   of	   questions	   and	   experiments	   that	   they	   would	   guess	  needed	  answers	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  Alzheimer’s	  drug.	  Thus,	  they	  came	   to	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   with	   what	   one	   of	   the	   research	   managers	  described	  as	  “an	  open	  mind”	  and	  a	  broad	  interest	  in	  what	  the	  scien-­‐tists	   from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   would	   suggest.	   They	   were	   meeting	   the	  Neuroscience	  department	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  During	  interviews	  they	  said	  they	  expected	  this	  meeting	  to	   lead	  to	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   input	  and	  new	  insights	  that	  they	  could	  take	  guidance	  from.	  Prior	  to	  the	  meeting	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic,	  the	  head	  of	  research	  from	  Lundbeck	  and	  the	  department	  manager	  of	  Neuroscience	  Research	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  had	  met	   to	  discuss	  collaboration	  scenarios.	  A	  busi-­‐ness	  developer	  from	  Lundbeck	  and	  a	  technology-­‐licensing	  manager	  from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   also	   attended	   this	   pre-­‐meeting.	   The	   head	   of	  research	   and	   the	   department	   manager	   had	   known	   each	   other	   for	  years	  and	  had	  often	  discussed	  various	  ideas	  for	  collaboration.	  How-­‐ever,	  until	  now	  they	  had	  not	  succeeded	  in	  defining	  a	  research	  project	  that	  would	   equally	   satisfy	   their	   interests.	   According	   to	   the	   head	   of	  research,	   the	   department	   manager	   at	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   was	   always	  looking	   for	  ways	   to	   get	   new	   funding	   for	   the	   research	   that	   already	  took	   place	   at	   his	   department.	   Getting	   funding	   had	   become	   more	  difficult,	   due	   to	  both	   general	   cut	   backs	  of	   grants	   from	   the	  National	  Institutes	   of	   Health	   and	   internal	   reorganizations	   between	   Mayo	  Clinic’s	   research	   sites	   both	   of	  which	   affected	   the	  Neuroscience	   de-­‐partment	  at	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  Often	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  department	  manager	  had	  presented	  ideas	  that	  the	  head	  of	  research	  at	  Lundbeck	  had	  eval-­‐
uated	  to	  be	  “too	  early”	  to	  engage	  with	  because	  the	  link	  to	  a	  potential	  drug	  was	   too	   vague.	   However,	   the	   head	   of	   research	   explained,	   the	  financial	  pressure	  on	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   seemed	  now	   to	  have	  become	  so	   severe	   that	   the	  department	  manager	  was	  willing	   to	   try	  out	  new	  types	  of	  collaboration	  with	  companies,	  even	  if	  this	  meant	  accepting	  more	  risks.	  Likewise,	   the	  head	  of	  research	  at	  Lundbeck	  had	  started	  thinking	   in	   new	   terms.	   New	   reports,	   such	   as	   Pricewaterhouse-­‐Cooper’s	   “Pharma	   2020:	  Which	   path	  will	   you	   take?”	   had	   come	   out	  suggesting	   that	   the	   current	   business	   model	   of	   the	   pharmaceutical	  industry	   was	   both	   economically	   unsustainable	   and	   operationally	  incapable	  of	   acting	  quickly	  enough	   to	  produce	   the	   types	  of	   innova-­‐tive	   treatments	   that	   global	   markets	   demanded.	   Ideas	   such	   as	   this	  had	  inspired	  the	  head	  of	  research	  to	  start	  formulating	  new	  research	  strategies	  that	   involved	  both	  engaging	   in	  research	  at	  stages	  that	  he	  used	   to	   think	  of	   as	   too	  early	  and	  engaging	  external	  partners	   in	   the	  process	  of	  developing	  new	  ideas.	  Thus,	   it	  seemed	  that	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   head	   of	   research	   and	   the	   department	  manager	   at	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  were	  starting	  to	  overlap.	  At	  the	  pre-­‐meeting,	  which	  took	  place	  at	  Lundbeck’s	  American	  re-­‐search	  site	  in	  Paramus,	  the	  head	  of	  research	  from	  Lundbeck	  and	  the	  department	   manager	   from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   discussed	   ideas	   for	   a	  model	   for	   collaboration.	  The	  department	  manager	  proposed	  an	  ar-­‐rangement	   in	   which	   there	   would	   be	   a	   clear	   distribution	   of	   roles.	  Scientists	   from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   would	   be	   responsible	   for	   the	   re-­‐search	   deliverables	   and	   Lundbeck	   would	   primarily	   participate	   by	  funding	  the	  work	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  According	  to	  the	  head	  of	  research’	  account,	  the	  department	  manager	  from	  Mayo	  Clin-­‐ic	  explained	  that	  he	  preferred	   that	  scientists	   from	  Lundbeck	  would	  not	   get	   access	   to	   the	   labs	   at	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   since	   this	  would	   only	  “complicate	  things”.	  However,	  getting	  access	  to	  these	  labs	  was	  exact-­‐ly	  what	   the	   head	   of	   research	   from	  Lundbeck	  was	   interested	   in.	  He	  suggested	   that	   the	   arrangement	   between	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   and	  Lundbeck	   would	   not	   develop	   into	   a	   “proper	   collaboration”	   before	  the	  two	  parties	  were	  working	  together	  on	  a	  specific	  research	  project.	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It	  was	  his	  impression,	  he	  later	  explained,	  that	  the	  pre-­‐meeting	  with	  the	  department	  manager	  led	  to	  a	  shared	  ambition	  of	  setting	  up	  such	  a	  “proper”	  collaborative	  arrangement.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  he	  prepared	  his	  group	  of	  research	  managers	   for	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  scientists	  at	  the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   in	   which	   they	   would	   discuss	   scenarios	   for	   a	   new	  type	  of	  collaboration.	  The	  meeting	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  scientists	  was	  planned	  as	  a	   one-­‐day	   scientific	   seminar	   at	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic.	   According	   to	   my	  interviews,	  the	  group	  of	  research	  managers	  expected	  a	  presentation	  of	   the	   research	   that	  was	   taking	  place	   at	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	   In	   return,	  they	  had	  prepared	  a	  presentation	  of	  their	  research	  interests	  in	  neu-­‐rodegenerative	  diseases.	  However,	  as	   I’m	  about	   to	  show,	   the	  group	  from	  Lundbeck	  was	  surprised	  by	  the	  way	  the	  department	  members	  presented	  their	  research.	  Especially,	  they	  were	  wondering	  about	  the	  way	  the	  presentations	  and	  the	  following	  dialogue	  suggested	  that	  the	  group	   from	  Lundbeck	  had	  particular	   “industrialist”	   interests	   in	   the	  data	  that	  differed	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  researchers’	  “scientific”	  ones.	  	  The	   meeting	   was	   hosted	   by	   the	   department	   manager	   from	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  Most	  of	  the	  day,	  it	  took	  place	  in	  a	  large	  conference	  room	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  The	  five	  representatives	  from	  Lundbeck	  sat	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  facing	  a	  large	  projection	  screen.	  From	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  10-­‐20	  scientists	   participated	   in	   the	  meeting.	  They	   came	   in,	  walked	   to	   the	  screen,	  put	  on	  their	  slide	  show	  and	  then	  left	  the	  room.	  Some	  of	  them	  would	   stay	   around	   for	   a	  while;	   listen	   to	   one	   or	   two	   presentations	  from	  their	  colleagues	  and	  then	  slowly	  get	  up	  and	  leave	  the	  room.	  In	  this	  way,	  there	  was	  a	  constant	  flow	  of	  people	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  room.	  After	  each	  presentation,	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives	  asked	  one	  or	  two	   questions.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	  meeting,	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   depart-­‐ment	   manager	   turned	   towards	   the	   Lundbeck	   representatives	   and	  said	   in	  a	   summarizing	  manner:	   “Well,	   this	   is	  what	  we	  got,	  what	  do	  you	  want?”	  	  During	   an	   interview,	   one	  of	   the	  Lundbeck	   representatives	   in	   the	  room	  later	  explained	  that	  when	  the	  department	  manager	  asked	  this	  question	  she	  knew	  for	  sure	  that	  the	  two	  groups	  had	  completely	  mis-­‐
understood	  each	  other.	  However,	  in	  hindsight,	  she	  explained,	  several	  things	   during	   the	   meeting	   had	   already	   suggested	   to	   her	   that	   they	  interpreted	  the	  situation	  in	  very	  different	  ways.	  During	  the	  meeting	  she	  had,	  for	  instance,	  been	  wondering	  how	  they	  would	  eventually	  be	  able	   to	  have	  a	   joint	  group	  discussion	  of	  which	   research	  projects	   to	  pursue	  when	  the	  individual	  researchers	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  left	  the	  room	   shortly	   after	   they	  had	  presented	   their	   own	   research.	  The	   re-­‐search	  managers	  from	  Lundbeck	  and	  the	  department	  manager	  were	  the	  only	  ones,	  who	  sat	  throughout	  the	  meeting	  and	  listened	  to	  all	  of	  the	   presentations	   and	   were	   now	   able	   to	   compare	   them.	   However,	  she	   later	   suggested	   to	  me	   that	   the	  particular	   set-­‐up	  of	   the	  meeting	  with	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists	   entering	   the	   room	   and	   “slipping	  away”	  was	  maybe	  not	  as	  odd	  as	  it	  first	  appeared.	  It	  was,	  rather,	  illus-­‐trative	   of	   the	   fundamental	   differences	   between	   “corporate”	   and	  “academic”	   culture.	  As	   she	   argued,	   it	  might	   in	   fact	   be	   that	   she	  was	  wrong	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  academics	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  would	  act	  as	   a	   group	   sitting	   in	   front	   of	   her	   group.	  As	   academics	   it	  was	   likely	  that	   each	   of	   them	   would	   have	   their	   own	   individual	   interests	   in	   a	  particular	   research	   topic.	   In	   contrast	   to	   this,	   her	   group	   was	   more	  open	   towards	   new	   ideas	   and	   had	   a	   broader	   interest	   in	   “whatever	  would	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   potentially	   of	   value	   for	   developing	   a	   new	  treatment”.	  	  What	   is	   going	   on	   in	   this	   meeting	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  Lundbeck	  research	  managers?	  And	  what	  do	  we	  learn	  about	  the	  mak-­‐ing	   of	   difference	   and	   sameness	   in	   collaboration?	   In	   the	   following	   I	  explore	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   “misunderstanding”	   that	   the	   research	  manager	   from	  Lundbeck	  accounts	   for	  above.	  At	   first	  sight,	   it	   seems	  that	   there	   are	   multiple	   readings	   of	   the	   situation	   at	   play,	   and	   that	  they	  contrast	   in	  ways	   that	  are	  somewhat	  confusing	   to	   the	  research	  managers	   from	  Lundbeck.	   In	  my	   account,	   I	  want	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	  popular	  recognition	  that	  people	  meet	  each	  other	  with	  prejudice	  and	  projection,	  and	  that	  misunderstandings	  such	  as	  the	  one	  pointed	  out	  above	  are	  the	  results	  of	  individual	  psychological	  constructs.	  Instead,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  understanding	  how	  this	  particular	   interpretation	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of	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  emerges.	  I	  am	  also	  interested	  in	   how	   “moves”	   are	  made	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	   changing	   particular	  interpretations.	  To	  do	  so,	  I	  use	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  screen	  as	  an	  analytical	  device	  or	  heuristic.	  	  I	   take	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   screen	   from	   Gilles	   Deleuze	   who	   states	  that	  “the	  screen	  makes	  something	  issue	  from	  chaos”	  (Deleuze	  1993:	  86).	  Without	  being	  very	  specific	  about	  what	  makes	  screens,	  Deleuze	  says	  that	  screens	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  conceptual	  filters	  that	  are	  inseparable	   from	  chaos.	   “Chaos	  does	  not	  exist”,	  he	  says,	   rather	   it	   is	  always	   “screened”	   and	   emerging	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   (ibid.).	   I	   take	  this	  broad	  understanding	  of	   the	  screen	   from	  Deleuze	  and	  use	   it	   for	  identifying	   what	   I	   call	   categorizing	   screens	   that	   appeared	   at	   the	  meeting	   between	   Lundbeck	   and	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists.	   As	   I	   go	  further	   into	   the	  material,	   I	   look	   for	   repertoires	   and	   structures	   that	  support	   a	   particular	   screen	  making.	   I	   look	   specifically	   at	   what	   the	  screen	  does	  once	   it	   is	  made	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	   interaction	   it	  opens	  up.	  As	  an	  analytical	  device,	  the	  potential	  strengths	  of	  “the	  screen”	  lie	  in	   its	   conceptual	   flexibility:	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  emphasize	   instances	  of	  both	  alignment	  and	  difference,	   and	  even	   investigate,	   as	   I	  will	  do	   in	  the	  following,	  processes	  in	  which	  readings,	  or	  screens,	  that	  differen-­‐tiate	  the	  participants	  transmute	  into	  screens	  that	  align	  them.	  In	  con-­‐trast,	   concepts	   such	   as	   the	   “trading	   zone”	   or	   “epistemic	   cultures”	  seem	  not	   to	   imply	   this	  analytical	   flexibility	  as	   they	   immediately	  di-­‐rect	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   analyst	   to	   processes	   of	   alignment,	   letting	  collaboration	  with	  difference	  remain	  somewhat	  unexplored.	  I	  focus	  primarily	  on	  two	  types	  of	  screens	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  meeting,	  a	  screen	  that	  made	  a	  separation	  between	  industrialists	  and	  academics,	  and	  a	  screen	  that	  constructed	  a	  common	  identity	  of	  “the	  scientist”.	   There	  were,	   of	   course,	   many	   other	   screens	   at	   play	   both	  during	   this	   particular	   meeting	   and	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   course	   of	   the	  collaboration.	   For	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   paper,	   however,	   I	   choose	   to	  focus	  only	  on	  these	  two	  screens	  to	  make	  a	  point	  about	  how	  research	  collaboration	   involves	   processes	   of	   both	   sameness	   and	   difference	  that	  are	  worth	  exploring	  further.	  Also	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  follow-­‐
ing	   account,	   I	   have	   taken	   a	   number	   of	   people	   from	   Lundbeck	   and	  constructed	  them	  as	  one	  voice	  although,	  during	  the	  interviews,	  they	  were	  not	  as	  homogeneous	  as	  I	  describe	  them.	  Thus,	  seeking	  to	  cap-­‐ture	  the	  workings	  of	  screens	  implies	  that	  in	  my	  analysis	  I	  screen	  off	  some	  of	  the	  heterogeneity	  present	  in	  the	  accounts.	  
The	  Industrialist/Scientist	  Screen	  What	  was	   the	   “misunderstanding”	   about?	   In	   their	   preparations	   for	  the	  meeting	   the	  research	  managers	   from	  Lundbeck	  had	   focused	  on	  the	  obvious	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  researchers.	  Like	  the	   scientists	   from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic,	   they	   were	   interested	   in	   what	  they	  described	  as	  an	  “in-­‐depth”	  understanding	  of	  the	  biological	  me-­‐chanisms	  involved	  in	  neurological	  diseases.	  Their	  new	  strategy	  sug-­‐gested	   that	   “basic	   research”	   understandings	   of	   these	   mechanisms	  might	  lead	  to	  new	  platforms	  for	  making	  drugs.	  In	  addition,	  they	  we-­‐re	   concerned	   with	   the	   link	   between	   “basic	   research”	   and	   clinical	  activities.	   At	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic,	   they	   encountered	   a	   similar	   concern	  since	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  had	  both	  “basic	  research	  activities”	  and	  a	  cli-­‐nic.	   Based	   on	   these	   impressions	   from	   preparing	   the	  meeting,	   they	  were	   expecting	   a	   debate	   in	  which	   both	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   and	   Lund-­‐beck	   representatives	  would	   have	   the	   “competency”	   and	   interest	   to	  discuss	  across	  concerns	  for	  basic	  research	  and	  commercial	  activities.	  However,	  what	   they	   encountered	  was	   scientific	   presentations	   that,	  on	   the	   one	   hand,	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   connect	  with	   their	   interests	   and	  open	  up	  for	  a	  joint	  discussion	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  handed	  to	   them	   along	   with	   the	   initiative	   to	   decide	   how	   to	   tailor	   them	   to	  “industrial”	  needs.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   “misunderstanding”	   seemed	  to	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  way	  the	  meeting	  resulted	  in	  a	  se-­‐paration	   of	   the	   participants	   into	   two	   diverging	   groups:	   Lundbeck	  “investors”	  and	  Mayo	  Clinic	  “scientists”.	  	  Although	  the	  making	  of	  this	  separation	  took	  the	  research	  manag-­‐ers	  from	  Lundbeck	  by	  surprise,	  they	  also	  pointed	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	   the	   meeting	   that	   made	   this	   reading	   possible	   and	   even	   likely.	   I	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suggest	  that	  both	  organizational	  and	  economic	  resources	  structured	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  divergence	  of	  the	  two	  groups	  that	  the	  Lundbeck	  researchers	  took	  away	  from	  the	  meeting.	  The	  reading	  did	  not	  appear	  out	  of	  thin	  air	  because,	  from	  a	  certain	  perspective,	  a	  group	  of	  indus-­‐trialists	  came	  to	  visit	  a	  group	  of	  academics	   in	  order	  to	  do	  business.	  First,	   there	   is	   a	   formal	   organizational	   difference	   between	   the	   two	  interacting	  groups.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  have	  a	  Danish	  pharmaceuti-­‐cal	   company	   that	   specializes	   in	   disorders	   in	   the	   central	   nervous	  system.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  an	  American	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	   research	  or-­‐ganization	  working	   in	   several	   research	   areas	   among	  which	   neuro-­‐degenerative	  diseases	  is	  one.	  	  Second,	  although	  the	  exact	  terms	  of	  the	  collaboration	  was	  not	  de-­‐cided	   prior	   to	   the	  meeting,	   the	   pre-­‐meeting	   had	   led	   to	   the	   under-­‐standing	  that	  Lundbeck	  would	  be	  paying	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  as	  part	  of	  the	   collaboration.	   What	   was	   still	   unclear	   was	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  scientists	   from	  Lundbeck	  would	  participate	   in	   developing	   research	  ideas	  and	  guiding	  the	  work	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  was	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  read	  the	  meeting	  as	  an	  encounter	  between	  a	   “buyer”	   and	   “seller”	  of	   science.	  However,	   as	   the	  head	  of	  research	  from	  Lundbeck	  expressed	  during	  an	  interview,	  it	  was	  utter-­‐ly	   surprising	   that	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	  would	   even	   put	   themselves	   into	  these	  categories	  because,	  as	  he	  explained,	  now	  they	  had	  the	  oppor-­‐tunity	  to	  get	  a	  proper	  scientific	   input	   from	  Lundbeck	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  payments.	  	   Finally,	   the	   reading	   of	   the	   set-­‐up	   as	   an	   “investor	  meeting”	   also	  drew	  on	  repertoires	  and	  ideas	  about	  what	  generally	  characterizes	  a	  science-­‐industry	  encounter	  and	  what	  differences	  are	  to	  be	  expected	  in	   such	   meetings.	   For	   instance,	   when	   the	   research	   manager	   from	  Lundbeck	  in	  hindsight	  suggested	  that	  she	  might	  have	  been	  wrong	  in	  expecting	   that	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   people	   would	   be	   interested	   in	   her	  general	  discussions	  about	  drug	  development	  opportunities,	  she	  was	  not	   only	   referring	   to	   experiences	   at	   the	  meeting	   but	   also	   bringing	  into	  play	  broader	  ideas	  about	  the	  cultural	  differences	  between	  “aca-­‐demia”	   and	   “industry”.	   For	   instance,	   she	   referred	   specifically	   to	  
structures	  at	  the	  university	  that	  make	  academics	  “individualist”	  and	  more	  interested	  in	  specific	  topics	  and	  ideas	  than	  industrialists.	  Dur-­‐ing	  the	  interview	  she	  reflected	  on	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  being	  able	  to	  find	  similarities	   that	   she	   entered	   the	   meeting	   with:	   “We	   cannot	   make	  them	  shift	  to	  new	  topics	  even	  if	  we	  wanted	  to.	  It	  wouldn’t	  be	  fair	  and	  they	  would	  never	  do	  it,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  under	  financial	  pressure.”	  Put	  differently,	   the	  particular	   separation	  of	  Lundbeck	   industrialists	  from	  Mayo	  Clinic	  “academics”	  was	  bringing	  into	  play	  broader	  reper-­‐toires	  stemming	  from	  policies,	  individual	  experiences,	  public	  under-­‐standings	  of	  science	  etc.	  that	  place	  companies	  at	  one	  end	  of	  a	  spec-­‐trum	  and	  non-­‐profit	  actors	  at	  the	  other	  end.	  Also,	  in	  their	  reflections	  on	  the	  meeting,	  the	  Lundbeck	  researchers	  constructed	  the	  scientists	  from	  Mayo	  as	  “academics”,	  a	  point	  that	  I	  will	  return	  to.	  	  Looking	  closer	  at	  how	  the	  Lundbeck	  research	  managers	  reflect	  on	  the	  meeting,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  an	   industrialist/scientist	  reading	  of	   the	  situation	   is	  also	  emerging	   from	  particular	  socio-­‐material	   fac-­‐tors	   in	   the	   situation.	   First,	   the	   research	   managers	   from	   Lundbeck	  noticed	  a	  lot	  of	  activity	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  room.	  This	  activity	  made	  it	  difficult	   to	   start	   a	   joint	   discussion	   because	   the	   participants	   in	   the	  meeting	   never	   formed	   as	   a	   group.	   The	   walking	   in	   and	   out	   of	   the	  meeting	   constructed	   the	  participants	   as	  having	  different	   roles.	   The	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  were	  doing	  their	  individual	  presentations.	  The	  Lundbeck	   representatives	   were	   surprised	   that	   they	  were	   asked	   to	  choose	   from	  the	  different	  proposals	  as	   they	  were	  hoping	  to	  get	  ad-­‐vice	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  on	  where	  and	  how	  to	  invest.	  The	  ending	  remark	  from	  the	  department	  manager	  “this	  is	  what	  we	  have,	  what	  do	  you	  want?”	  fuelled	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  situation	  by	  making	  a	  sharp	   distinction	   between	   the	   “assets”	   of	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   and	   the	  “demand”	  from	  Lundbeck.	  At	  this	  point,	  a	  researcher	  from	  Lundbeck	  explained,	   the	   course	   of	   the	  meeting	   did	   not	   suggest	   that	   the	   two	  groups	  would	  eventually	  work	  together	  on	  a	  joint	  research	  project.	  	   Second,	   according	   to	   the	   Lundbeck	   researcher’s	   reflections	   in	  hindsight,	   the	   very	   presentations	   also	   distinguished	   Mayo	   Clinic	  scientists	   from	   the	   Lundbeck	   research	   managers.	   During	   an	   inter-­‐
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view,	  one	  of	   the	   research	  managers	   from	  Lundbeck	  described	  how	  the	  presentations	  produced	   some	   confusion	   since	   they	   seemed	  not	  to	   be	   coordinated	   between	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists.	   This	   left	   her	  with	  the	  impression	  of	  being	  “bombarded	  with	  data”:	  	   We	  didn’t	  know	  what	  we	  wanted	  within	  the	  biology	  of	  tau.	  They	  were	  the	  ones	  to	  give	  us	  that	   input.	   If	   it	  had	  been	   their	   gamble	   and	   their	  money,	  what	  would	   they	  do?	  Were	  we	   to	   look	   for	   the	   toxic	   species	   of	   tau	   that	  one	  of	  the	  researchers	  suggested?	  One	  researcher	  said,	  “I	  think	  it’s	  these	  fibrilar	  kinds	  that	  are	  important”.	  An-­‐other	  one	  said	   that	  he	   thought	   it	  was	   the	  volume	   that	  was	  important.	  But	  they	  didn’t	  agree.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  meeting,	  the	  scientists	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  seemed	  not	  to	  have,	  as	   the	   research	  manager	   from	  Lundbeck	  expected,	   compa-­‐red	   and	   discussed	   data	   across	   presentations.	   Rather	   data	   was	  thrown	   at	   them	   –	   hence	   the	   perception	   of	   being	   “bombarded	  with	  data”.	   Instead	   of	   providing	   the	   group	   from	   Lundbeck	   with	   the	   re-­‐search	  ideas	  that	  they	  were	  looking	  for,	  the	  presentations	  merely	  led	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  being	  overwhelmed.	  In	  these	  accounts,	  the	  Lundbeck	  research	  managers	   put	   themselves	   onto	   the	   screen.	   Although	   they	  complain	   to	   be	   screened	   as	   “industrialists”	   they	   make	   comments	  that	   support	   this	   reading.	   Being	   bombarded	   with	   data	   is	   a	   rare	  objection	  among	   researchers.	   In	   contrast,	   it	   is	   common	   in	   industry	  to	  ask	  for	  focus	  and	  framing	  of	  a	  problem	  or	  task.	  	  	  	  	  The	   presentations	   had	   another	   important	   effect.	   During	   inter-­‐views,	  one	  of	  the	  research	  managers	  from	  Lundbeck	  mentioned	  that	  the	  presentations	  were	  surprisingly	  “high	   level”	  as	   if	   it	  were	  a	  “sci-­‐entific	  meeting”.	  However,	  while	  presenting	  detailed	   scientific	  data	  on	  proteins	   and	  mechanisms	   that	   the	   individual	  Mayo	  Clinic	   scien-­‐tists	  were	  working	  with,	   they	   did	   not,	   according	   to	  my	   interviews,	  include	   the	   group	   from	   Lundbeck	   in	   their	   talks;	   here	   the	   analogy	  with	  a	   scientific	  meeting	  stopped.	  The	  way	   the	  data	  was	  presented	  
to	   the	  Lundbeck	  visitors	   suggested	   that	   the	  audience	  would	  not	  be	  interested	  in	  or	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  and	  detail	  in	   the	   presentations,	   they	   said.	   However,	   as	   they	   moved	   through	  presentations	   this	  started	   to	  displease	   the	  research	  managers	   from	  Lundbeck.	  The	  research	  managers	  became	  gradually	  more	  engaged	  in	   the	  presentations	   and	   started	   asking	  questions	   that	  would	   illus-­‐trate	   how	   they	   were	   wrongly	   construed	   as	   industrialists	   and	   fully	  capable	  of	  taking	  a	  scientific	  approach	  to	  the	  data.	  At	  first,	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  did	  not	   treat	   the	  questions	   from	  the	  research	  man-­‐agers	   as	   worthy	   of	   serious	   consideration	   but	   continued	   to	   display	  their	  differentiation	  of	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  and	  Lundbeck	  manag-­‐ers:	  	   You	  hear	   it	   in	   the	  way	   they	   respond	   to	  you.	   It	   takes	  a	  while	  before	  they	  start	  responding	  scientifically	  to	  your	  questions.	  Our	  questions	  were	  very	  scientific	  and	  spe-­‐cific,	  but	  in	  the	  beginning	  they	  sort	  of	  dismissed	  us.	  	  	  What	  did	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  industrialist/scientist	  screen	  accom-­‐plish	   in	   the	   meeting?	   First,	   the	   screen	   seemed	   to	   sideline	   the	   re-­‐search	  managers	   from	  Lundbeck	  from	  science.	  The	  science	  that	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   researchers	   presented	  was	  presented	   as	   “ready-­‐made”	  science	  (Latour	  1987),	  i.e.	  it	  was	  introduced	  as	  a	  package	  that	  could	  be	  accepted	  or	  declined	  by	  an	  investor.	  It	  was	  far	  from	  the	  science-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making	  (ibid.)	  that	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives	  were	  expec-­‐ting.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   screen	   sidelined	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   resear-­‐chers	   from	   considering	   the	   commercial	   potential	   of	   their	   research.	  The	  ending	   remark	  by	   the	  department	  manager	   suggested	   that	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   “academics”	   were	   unable	   to	   evaluate	   the	   commercial	  potential	  of	  their	  research	  and	  were	  leaving	  this	  judgement	  to	  Lund-­‐beck	  industrialists.	  	  Second,	  the	  screen	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  producing	  a	  particular	  idea	  of	  collaboration.	  The	  group	   from	  Lundbeck	  was	  expecting	   “a	  strategic	  alliance”.	   According	   to	   their	   new	   strategy,	   this	   meant	   engaging	   in	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collaboration	  with	  external	  research	  groups	  on	  topics	  that	  they	  were	  not	   experts	   in	   themselves,	   but	   nonetheless	   able	   to	   take	   part	   in	   as	  scientists	  with	  a	  scientific	  training	  in	  biology	  or	  chemistry.	  However,	  although	  they	  were	  potentially	  short	  of	  expertise	  in	  these	  situations,	  they	  expected	  that	   their	  new	  open	  approach	  would	  be	  met	  with	  an	  invitation	   to	   joint	   collaboration.	   One	   researcher	   from	   Lundbeck	  explained	  that	  his	  idea	  of	  collaboration	  as	  “putting	  efforts	  together”	  was	   completely	   contrasted	   with	   how	   collaboration	   was	   screened	  during	  the	  meeting.	  	  	  	   We	  have	  a	  hope	  that	  we	  can	  move	  forward	  much	  faster	  if	  we	  put	  all	  of	  our	  efforts	  together	  in	  this,	  whereas	  the	  way	  I	  think	  they	  understood	  the	  situation	  was	  “they	  are	  here	  to	  put	  down	  a	  payment”.	  	  According	  to	  this	  researcher,	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  read	  collabo-­‐ration	  as	  taking	  place	  following	  a	  particular	  order	  and	  a	  distribution	  of	  tasks.	  Collaboration	  would	  not	  involve	  much	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interac-­‐tion	  but	  rather	  centre	  on	  an	  exchange	  of	  results	  at	  specific	  points	  in	  the	  collaboration.	  	  	  They	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  sequential	  thing.	  That	  is,	  that	  first	  they	  would	  do	  something	  and	  then	  we	  would	  take	  it	  and	  pay	  something	   for	   it	   and	   then	   their	   tech	   transfer	   would	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  got	  what	  they	  needed	  to	  get	  out	  of	  it.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Lundbeck	  research	  managers,	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   scientists’	   reading	   of	   the	   collaboration	   as	   a	   series	   of	   well-­‐planned	   deliverables	   from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   to	   Lundbeck	   dismissed	  the	   scientific	  merits	   of	   the	   group	   of	   Lundbeck	   researchers.	   One	   of	  them	  explained	  that	  he	  was	  a	  bit	  disappointed	  by	  being	  treated	  as	  a	  “cash	  cow”	  when	  he	  was	   in	   fact	   “scientifically	   challenging”	   some	  of	  the	  ideas	  presented.	  Why	  was	  this	  not	  noticed,	  he	  wondered.	  During	  
the	  meeting	  he	  became	  more	  and	  more	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  im-­‐plied	  perception	  that	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives	  would	  be	   likely	  to	   “think	   in	   boxes”	   and	   therefore	   had	   a	   precise	   idea	   of	   what	   they	  wanted.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  he	  encountered	  this	  reading	  but	  something	  he	  had	  often	  met	  before:	  	  We	  need	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  industry	  part-­‐ner	  is	  a	  cash	  cow	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  projects.	  In	  these	  situations	  we	  have	   to	   take	   them	  by	   the	  hand,	  because	  that	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  we	  meet	  very	  often	  –	  that	  is	  that	  we	  just	  give	  them	  money	  and	  then	  they	  can	  keep	  on	  working	  on	  whatever	  they	  want	  to	  work	  on.	  	  If	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives	  were	  all	  familiar	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	   being	   construed	   as	   industrialists	  why	   did	   it	   then	   surprise	   them	  and	  come	  up	  as	  a	   “misunderstanding”?	  First	   they	  explained	   that	   in	  their	  preparation	  they	  had	  noticed	  many	  similarities	  between	  Lund-­‐beck	  and	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  They	  did	  not	  see	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  as	   academics	   exclusively	   involved	   in	   basic	   research.	   Instead	   they	  had	  noticed	  that	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  seemed	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  genuine	  wish	  to	  develop	  new	  treatment	  for	  patients.	  	  	  They	  [the	  Mayo	  Clinic]	  also	  had	  as	  a	  declared	  goal	  that	  their	   research	   should	   produce	   something	   that	   would	  eventually	   be	   of	   benefit	   to	   patients	   […]	   There	  was	   no	  doubt	   that	   their	  research	  was	  driven	   towards	  an	   indi-­‐cation	   at	   the	   other	   end,	   it	  wasn’t	   basic	   exploration	   as	  such.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  head	  of	  research	  explained,	  they	  had	  become	  particularly	   interested	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   was	   also	   a	  hospital.	   In	   this	   they	   saw	   an	   option	   for	   involving	   clinicians	   in	   the	  research	   collaboration.	   In	   other	   words,	   several	   circumstances	   led	  the	  Lundbeck	  scientists	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  link	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at	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  between	  basic	  and	  clinical	  research	  and	  they	  were	  interested	   in	  making	  use	   of	   this	   link.	   Consequently,	   they	   explained	  during	   interviews,	   they	  were	   not	   expecting	   it	   to	   be	   too	   difficult	   to	  connect.	  They	  had	  met	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  department	  with	  a	  group	  of	  their	  most	   experienced	   and	   skilled	   scientists.	   They	  were	   expecting	  the	   researchers	   from	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   to	  be	  excited	  about	   the	  over-­‐lapping	   interests	   as	  well	   as	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Lundbeck	   researchers	  were	  proposing	  an	  open	  and	  explorative	  approach	  that	  presumably	  would	  fit	  well	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  “academics”	  at	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  In	  this	  situation	  it	  seemed	  that	  they	  were	  forgetting	  that	  the	  Mayo	  Cli-­‐nic	   scientists	   were	   in	   fact	   not	   working	   in	   an	   “academic”	   environ-­‐ment,	  but	  as	  scientists	  at	  a	  research	  institution	  and	  clinic.	  However,	  it	  seemed	  that	  constructing	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  as	  “academics”	  was	   a	  way	   of	   producing	   a	   new	   screen	   that	   screened	   the	   Lundbeck	  researchers	  as	  scientists	  rather	  than	  industrialists.	  
The	  Scientist/Scientist	  Screen	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Lundbeck	   scientists	   an	   industria-­‐list/scientist	  screen	  dominated	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  meeting	  between	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  and	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives.	  Yet,	  the	  research	  managers	  from	  Lundbeck	  attempted	  to	  change	  the	  screen.	  I	  now	  explore	  the	  work	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  screen	  changing.	  One	  of	  the	  Lundbeck	  managers	   explained	   during	   interviews	   that	   although	   the	  “high	  level”	  of	  the	  presentations	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  inclusion	  in	  debates	  had	  distracted	  him,	  he	  eventually	  became	  absorbed	  in	  the	  ideas	  that	  were	  presented.	  He	  started	  asking	  specific	  questions	  to	  the	  science.	  What	  methods	  were	  used	  in	  this	  experiment?	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  here,	  what	  does	  it	  take	  to	  do	  the	  same	  in	  this	  case?	  During	  one	  of	  the	  pre-­‐sentations,	   a	   scientific	   debate	   formed.	  The	  Mayo	  Clinic	   researchers	  showed	  signs	  of	  interest	  in	  his	  inquiries.	  	  	   At	   some	   point	   then	   they	   start	   to	   realize	   I	   was	   asking	  some	  questions.	  It	  was	  a	  completely	  new	  discovery	  and	  
very	  exciting	  for	  us	  as	  we	  were	  all	  getting	  involved	  in	  a	  scientific	  discussion.	  	  	  During	  interviews,	  the	  research	  manager	  explained	  that	  there	  was	  a	  specific	   point	   in	   the	   discussions	   where	   the	   department	   manager	  from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  realized	  “his	  mistake”:	  	   Then	   all	   of	   a	   sudden	   the	   department	   manager	   inter-­‐rupts	   and	   says:	   “wait	   a	  minute,	   this	   is	   actually	   a	   very	  good	   suggestion”.	   It	   was	   also	   new	   to	   them	   and	   they	  didn’t	  know	   […]	   it	  was	  a	  different	  way	  of	   interpreting	  the	  data.	  	  
 According	  to	  the	  research	  manager,	  this	  moment	  made	  the	  meeting	  open	  up	  and	  gave	  him	  an	  opportunity	   for	  changing	   the	  screen.	  Du-­‐ring	   the	  debate	   that	   the	  research	  manager	   from	  Lundbeck	  now	  de-­‐scribed	  as	  “animated”,	  the	  research	  manager	  from	  Lundbeck	  menti-­‐oned	   that	   he	   had	   published	   scientific	  work	   on	   the	   topic	   they	  were	  discussing.	  In	  fact,	  he	  held	  a	  position	  as	  associate	  professor	  at	  a	  large	  well-­‐esteemed	  Danish	  university	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  divi-­‐sional	  director	  at	  Lundbeck.	  Laying	  down	  what	  he	  described	  as	  his	  “Associate	  Professor	   card”	   changed	   the	   situation	   completely.	   “I	   im-­‐mediately	   became	   an	   academic,”	   he	   explained.	   By	   this	   gesture,	   it	  seemed	   that	   the	   scientist/industrialist	   screen	   transmuted	   into	   a	  scientist/scientist	  screen:	  	  	  	  	   Right	  away,	  the	  talk	  goes	  around	  the	  table.	  “Oh	  he’s	  al-­‐so	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Aarhus?”	   and	   things	   like	   that.	  Then	   you’re	   in.	   Sometimes	   they	   even	   check	   your	   CV,	  most	  of	  the	  time	  they	  expect	  that	  you	  will	  then	  have	  an	  interesting	   CV.	   It	   takes	   a	   really	   long	   time	   before	   they	  notice	  that	  you’re	  not	  just	  a	  big	  pocket	  of	  money.	  It’s	  a	  different	  form	  of	  interaction	  that	  we	  get	  into.	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  What	  work	  does	  the	  scientist/scientist	  screen	  do	  in	  the	  situation?	  It	  is	  notable	   that	   there	   is	  a	  change	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  attention	  at	   the	  meeting	  and	  different	  kinds	  of	  actors	  now	  come	  into	  play.	  Before	  the	  researcher	   “laid	   down	   his	   card”,	   the	   attention	   was	   directed	   at	   the	  presentations	   and	   the	  projection	   screen.	  When	   the	   screen	   changed	  from	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  Lundbeck	   researcher,	   the	  attention	  be-­‐came	  directed	  at	  the	  other	  group	  –	  as	  the	  researcher	  explained,	  “the	  talk	  goes	  around	  the	  table”.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  Lundbeck	  researchers	  were	  able	  to	  get	  into	  the	  kind	  of	  interaction	  that	  they	  were	  originally	  hoping	   for	   and	   that	   they	   thought	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   most	   fruitful	  collaboration.	  	  What	   does	   the	   scientist/scientist	   screen	   draw	   on?	   Although	   the	  researcher	   from	   Lundbeck	   explained	   that	   changing	   the	   framework	  did	   not	   go	  without	   difficulty,	   the	   scientist/scientist	   framework	   did	  not	   come	   out	   of	   thin	   air.	   The	   Lundbeck	   researcher	   drew	   on	   well-­‐known	   scientific	   “indicators”	   such	   as	   associate	   professorships,	   CVs	  and	   publications	   in	   scientific	   journals	   of	   interest	   to	   the	   group.	   In	  addition,	   he	   explained	   that	   he	  was	   careful	   about	   the	  way	  he	   asked	  questions	  to	  the	  presentations.	  He	  would	  not	  ask	  questions	  relating	  to	   the	   potential	   value	   of	   the	   research,	   as	   an	   investor	  would	   be	   ex-­‐pected	  to	  do.	  Instead,	  he	  asked	  questions	  to	  the	  specific	  experiments	  and	  research	  questions	  that	  had	  gone	  into	  producing	  the	  data.	  	  	  According	   to	   the	   Lundbeck	   research	   managers,	   the	   screen	  changed	   in	   significant	   ways	   during	   the	   first	  meeting.	   This	  made	   it	  possible	   to	   “get	   on	   with	   the	   work”	   and	   turn	   the	   encounter	   into	   a	  collaboration,	  which	  I	  will	  soon	  return	  to.	  However,	  a	  separation	  of	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives	  and	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  did	  not	  completely	  vanish	  from	  the	  collaboration.	  After	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  sci-­‐entists	   had	   presented	   their	   ideas,	   the	   Lundbeck	   researchers	   pre-­‐sented	   their	   research	   ideas	   and	   aspirations.	   As	   mentioned	   before	  they	  had	  prepared	  a	  presentation	  prior	   to	   the	  meeting	  and,	   as	  one	  researcher	   explained	   during	   interviews,	   they	   had	   deliberately	   not	  included	   “business	   talk”	   into	   the	   presentation	   but	   kept	   it	   “strictly	  
scientific”.	  With	  this	  presentation,	  they	  wanted	  to	  show	  “their	  com-­‐mitment	  to	  research”.	  However,	  the	  Lundbeck	  representatives	  never	  gave	   their	  presentation,	  not	  because	   they	   found	   it	   irrelevant	   to	   the	  discussions	  that	   formed,	  but	  because	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  scientists	  had	  asked	  them	  not	  to	  give	  it.	  At	  the	  first	  meeting,	  the	  department	  man-­‐ager	  explained	  he	  was	  afraid	  that	  the	  Lundbeck	  presentation	  would	  contain	  data	  that	  would	  eventually	  become	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   scientists’	   freedom	   to	   operate.	   To	   him,	   knowing	   what	   the	  Lundbeck	  researchers	  knew	  implied	  a	  risk	  that	  he	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  run.	  The	   information	  could,	   at	   a	   later	  point,	   eventually	  prevent	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  from	  claiming	  a	  particular	  research	  result	  as	  their	  prop-­‐erty	  or	  prevent	  them	  from	  publishing	  certain	  ideas	  as	  their	  own.	  The	  “open	   and	   free”	   interaction	   that	   the	   Lundbeck	   researchers	   found	  promising	  for	  “a	  proper	  collaboration”	  was	  suddenly	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  industrialist/scientist	  emerged	  in	  a	  new	   form	   according	   to	   the	   Lundbeck	   meeting	   participants.	   For	   a	  moment,	  they	  suggested,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  concern	  for	  “profit”	  had	  entered	  the	  relation,	  however	  this	  time	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  primarily	  a	  concern	  of	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic.	   In	   this	  way,	   according	   to	   the	  Lundbeck	  researchers,	   the	   industrialist/scientist	   screen	   first	   placed	   them	   on	  the	   industrialist	   side	   and	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   at	   the	   academic/open-­‐minded	  side,	  and	   later	  appeared	   in	  a	  new	  form	  and	   in	  reverse,	  dis-­‐playing	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   as	   the	  most	   profit-­‐oriented	   partner	   of	   the	  two.	  	  Based	   on	   this	   account	   of	   the	   first	   encounter	   between	   groups	   of	  scientists	   from	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  and	  Lundbeck,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  the	   industrialist/scientist	   screen	   was	   fatal	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   a	  collaboration	   between	   Mayo	   Clinic	   and	   Lundbeck.	   However,	   the	  following	  accounts	  from	  research	  managers	  in	  Lundbeck	  of	  how	  the	  collaboration	  evolved	   tell	  a	  different	  story.	  The	  surprise	  relating	   to	  the	  way	  they	  were	  framed	  during	  the	  meeting	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  failed	  collaboration.	   A	   failed	   first	   meeting,	   at	   the	   most.	   So	   how	   was	   the	  encounter	  turned	  into	  a	  collaboration?	  According	  to	  one	  researcher	  from	   Lundbeck,	   formulating	   a	   research	   proposal	   did	   this.	   Despite	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noticeable	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   parties,	   both	   groups	   were	  interested	   in	   working	   together.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   meeting,	   a	   re-­‐searcher	  from	  Lundbeck	  suggested	  that	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  researchers	  translated	   their	   presentations	   into	   “grant	   applications”	   that	   would	  aim	  at	  developing	  a	  drug.	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  was	  facing	   financial	   problems	   and	   the	   Neuroscience	   department	   was	  already	   spending	   considerable	   time	   on	   applying	   for	   external	   fund-­‐ing.	  Also	  many	  of	   the	   researchers	   at	   the	  Mayo	  Clinic	   had	  held	   aca-­‐demic	  positions	  at	  universities	  before	  they	  came	  to	  Mayo	  Clinic,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  sketching	  a	  research	  proposal	  was	  perfectly	  well-­‐known	  to	   them.	  The	   two	  groups	  decided	   to	  have	   a	   second	  meeting.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	   individual	   researchers	   at	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   wrote	   a	  research	   proposal	   that	   was	   sent	   to	   Lundbeck.	   After	   having	   priori-­‐tized	   the	   proposals,	   the	   Lundbeck	   researchers	   came	   back	   to	   the	  Mayo	   Clinic	   for	   the	   second	   round	   of	   meetings	   in	   which	   they	   had	  sessions	  with	   the	   individual	   scientists	  whose	   ideas	   they	   found	   the	  most	   interesting.	  After	   rounds	  of	  adjusting	   the	  proposal,	   a	   contract	  was	   made.	   It	   contained	   three	   research	   projects	   that	   each	   had	   an	  assigned	   principal	   investigator	   from	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   and	   engaged	  scientists	  from	  Lundbeck	  as	  well.	  	  From	   interviews	   with	   Lundbeck	   researchers,	   it	   seemed	   that	   the	  production	   of	   a	   joint	   research	   proposal	   and	   eventually	   a	   contract	  screened	  the	  two	  groups	  as	  researchers.	  Was	  the	  scientist/scientist	  screen	   then	   a	   first	   step	   in	   creating	   a	   kind	   of	   sameness	   among	   the	  participants	  of	  the	  meeting?	  I	  suggest	  that	  during	  their	  first	  encoun-­‐ter	   a	   slightly	  modified	   version	   of	   a	   scientist	   emerged.	   Although,	   or	  perhaps	   because,	   differences	   between	   the	   participants	   had	   been	  displayed	   they	   “invented”	   a	   common	   identity	   of	   the	   scientist	   as	  someone,	   who	   is	   knowledgeable	   about	   and	   value	   publications,	   de-­‐grees	  and	  past	  positions.	  This	  might	  indicate,	  like	  has	  been	  suggest-­‐ed	   by	  much	   literature	   on	   science-­‐industry	   relations,	   that	   forces	   of	  alignment	   will	   always	   be	   stronger	   than	   divergence	   in	   successful	  collaborations.	   I	   do	   not	   see	   the	   first	   encounter	   between	   Lundbeck	  and	  Mayo	  Clinic	   scientists	   this	  way.	   Instead,	   I	  propose	  we	   focus	  on	  
the	  moment	  where	   the	   research	  manager	   from	  Lundbeck	  attempts	  to	  change	  the	  screen,	  and	  see	  it	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  connecting	  the	  two	  groups	  while	  maintaining	  a	  sense	  of	  difference.	  His	  intervention	  did	  not	  erase	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  Lundbeck	  participants	  were	   “industrial-­‐ists”,	  who	  know	  what	  they	  want,	  but	  it	  did	  create	  an	  understanding	  among	   the	   collaborators	   that	   scientific	   endeavour	   can	   take	   many	  different	  shapes	  and	  be	  carried	  out	  for	  different	  reasons.	  	  
Discussion	  In	   this	   paper,	   I	   have	   explored	   the	   nature	   of	   difference	   in	   research	  collaboration.	  I	  have	  asked	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  successful	  colla-­‐boration	   always	   implies	   aligning	   of	   differences	   in	   interests,	  backgrounds	  and	  aims	  that	  the	  participants	  enter	  collaboration	  with.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  using	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  screen	  allows	  for	  analy-­‐sis	  of	  how	  both	  difference	  and	  sameness	  are	  made	   in	  collaborative	  practices.	   Specifically,	   I	   have	   been	   interested	   in	   how	   divergence	  emerges.	  The	  empirical	  account	  that	  I	  have	  given	  suggests	  that	   it	   is	  certainly	   possible	   to	   collaborate	  with	   difference.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	  making	   of	   strongly	   differentiating	   screens	   in	   first	   encounters	   bet-­‐ween	  groups	  of	  collaborators	  does	  not	  make	  collaboration	  less	  inte-­‐resting	   or	   impossible	   to	   engage	   in.	   However,	   having	   said	   this,	   the	  analysis	  also	  suggests	  that	  part	  of	  what	  takes	  place	  in	  collaboration	  is	   negotiating	   these	   screens	   so	   they	   do	   not	   entirely	   disconnect	   the	  collaborators.	   The	   scientist/scientist	   screen	   that	   was	   eventually	  made	   in	   the	   meeting	   between	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists	   and	   the	  Lundbeck	   research	  managers	  did	  not	   remove	  or	   reduce	  difference.	  Rather,	   it	   made	   an	   important	   shared	   object	   emerge:	   The	   slightly	  modified	  scientist.	  This	  object	  created	  a	  framework,	  which	  held	  the	  differences	   between	   the	   two	   groups	   in	   place	   and	   allowed	   them	   to	  develop.	  	   What	  does	   this	   tell	  us	  about	  screens?	  First,	   there	  are,	  of	   course,	  multiple	  screens.	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  two	  screens	  that	  I	  found	  were	  of	  particular	   importance	   to	   the	   researchers	   at	   Lundbeck.	   Other	   ana-­‐
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lysts	   would	   have	   seen,	   for	   instance,	   gender	   screens,	   age	   screens	  separating	   senior	   managers	   from	   junior	   scientists,	   or	   cultural	  screens	   distinguishing	   the	   Danish	   participants	   from	   the	   American.	  Second,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  misconstruing	  “emerging	  screens”	  in	  realist	  terms,	   producing	   accounts	   of	   filters	   that	   appear	   and	   immediately	  become	   apparent	   to	   everybody	   in	   the	   room.	   This	   is	   not	   the	   case.	  Screens	  are	  made	  and	  unmade,	  and	  as	  the	  account	  shows,	  with	  some	  effort	   they	   can	  be	   exchanged	  with	   other	   screens.	   The	   analysis	   also	  shows	  that	  screens	  are	  not	  made	  out	  of	  nothing;	  they	  are	  situational	  and	  constructed	  out	  of	  available	  economic	  and	  organizational	  struc-­‐tures	  as	  well	  as	  prevalent	  repertoires	  for	  understanding,	  in	  this	  case,	  science-­‐industry	   interaction.	   Third,	   screens	   are	   partial	   and	   seen	  from	  particular	  positions.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  research	  managers	  from	  Lundbeck	  all	  recognized	  the	  industrialist/scientist	  difference,	  which	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  screen.	  Also,	  they	  recognized	  the	  scientist/scientist	  dif-­‐ference,	  which	  they	  thought	  that	  the	  Mayo	  Clinic	  researchers	  did	  not	  see,	  or	  rather,	  did	  not	  see	  until	  it	  was	  strongly	  suggested	  to	  them.	  It	  is	   therefore	  more	   accurate	   to	   talk	   of	   “screening”	   than	   “screens”,	   in	  this	  way	  emphasizing	  several	  important	  aspects	  of	  screens:	  the	  pro-­‐
cess	  of	  making	  a	  screen,	  what	  a	  screen	  does,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  a	  screen	  for	   the	   purpose	   it	   has	   been	   made	   for.	   This	   would	   also	   give	   more	  emphasis	   to	   the	   “screening	   devices”	   that	   are	   used	   in	   making	   and	  changing	   screens	   such	   as,	   in	   this	   case,	   publication	   lists,	   professor-­‐ships,	  and	  research	  proposals.	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  for	  thinking	  about	   science-­‐industry	   relations?	  More	   generally,	   the	   analysis	   sug-­‐gests	  that	  collaboration	  does	  not	  always	  require	  alignment	  and	  that	  sameness	   is	  not	  always	  the	  product	  of	  working	  together.	  This	  chal-­‐lenges	   the	   idea	   that	   relationships	  between	  universities	  and	  compa-­‐nies	  are	  as	  such	  a	  threat	  to	  academic	  research,	  an	  idea	  that	  has	  been	  put	   forward	   as	   a	   critical	   “convergence	   argument”	   in	   parts	   of	   the	  literature	   on	   science-­‐industry	   relations	   (Croissant	  &	  Restivo	   2001;	  Kleinman	  &	  Vallas	  2006;	  Krimsky	  2003;	  Owen-­‐Smith	  2006;	  Resnik	  2007;	   Vallas	  &	  Kleinman	  2007)	   and	  by	   Isabelle	   Stengers	   (Stengers	  
2011).	   What	   is	   this	   assumed	   threat	   to	   academic	   research	   about?	  According	   to	   Kleinman	   &	   Vallas,	   for	   instance,	   the	   problem	   is	   that	  when	   universities	   and	   companies	   collaborate,	   they	   converge	   in	   an	  “asymmetrical”	  way	   (Kleinman	  &	  Vallas	  2006:	  37).	  The	  authors	  ar-­‐gue	   that	   although	   the	   new	   hybrid	   outcomes	   of	   collaboration	   are	  based	  on	  codes	  and	  practices	   from	  both	   the	  universities	  and	   indus-­‐try	   it	   is	   the	   logic	   of	   profit	   that	   wins	   in	   the	   process	   of	   converging.	  Whereas	   industry	   adopts	   the	   codes	   and	   practices	   of	   academic	   cul-­‐ture	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   increasing	   profitability,	   academia	   draws	   on	  industrial	   codes	  and	  practices	   for	   commercial	  purposes	  or	  because	  of	   the	   legitimacy	   that	   universities	   gain	   by	   adopting	   elements	   of	  commercial	  culture	  (ibid.).	  In	  other	  words,	  Kleinman	  &	  Vallas	  argue	  that	   something	   is	   lost	   in	   the	   process	   of	   collaboration	   and	   this	  will	  always	  be	  at	   the	  “academic	  side”	  of	   the	  equation.	  However,	   the	   im-­‐age	  of	  a	  risk	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  collaboration	  is	  always	  a	  mat-­‐ter	  of	  reducing	  differences.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  things	  from	  a	  position	  within	  industry	  like	  I	  have	  done,	  things	  look	  slightly	  different.	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case	   that	   “industry	  wins”.	  Above	   I	   have	   shown	  how	   attempts	   to	   collaborate	   brought	   out	   more	   differences	   than	  compromises.	   The	   specific	   relations	   established	   did	   not	   “compro-­‐mise	   academic	   science”,	   but	   brought	   out	   nuances	   in	   positions	   and	  perceived	  identities.	  Also,	  as	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  suggests,	  it	  is	  not	   always	   the	   industrialists	  who	  are	  dominating	   the	   relation,	   and,	  consequently,	  we	  might	  reconsider	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  an	  asymmetrical	  relationship.	  At	  least,	  asymmetry	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  individ-­‐ual	  case.	  Isabelle	   Stengers	   has	   put	   forward	   a	   general	   critique	   of	   science-­‐industry	   relations	   based	   on	   reflections	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  knowledge	   economy	   on	   scientific	   processes.	   First,	   she	   argues	   that	  what	   links	   scientists	   is	   interest.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   interest,	   or	  
inter-­‐esse,	   is	   not	   easily	   accomplished	  but	   requires	   thorough	   testing	  and	  scrutinizing	  because	  becoming	   interested	   in	  something	   implies	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  wrong	  (Stengers	  1997:	  83-­‐84).	  The	  bonds	  of	  inter-­‐est	  between	  scientists	  are	  crucial	  for	  producing	  scientific	  reliability,	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she	  argues.	  The	  problem	  is,	  according	  to	  Stengers,	  that	  in	  collabora-­‐tions	   between	   scientists	   and	   industrial	   partners,	   scientists	   do	   not	  feel	   the	  same	  duty	   to	  produce	   facts	   that	   resist	   their	  colleagues’	  ob-­‐jections	   (Stengers	   2011:	   54).	   They	  will	   not	   be	   equally	   encouraged,	  she	   says,	   because	   “industrial	   interests	   do	   not	   need	   experimental	  reliability”.	  My	   analysis	   does	   not	   support	   this	   very	   general	   idea	   of	  industrialists’	   concern	   for	   reliability.	   Rather,	   it	   suggests	   that	   being	  able	   to	   challenge	  data	   and	   ideas	  was	   an	   important	   concern	   for	   the	  Lundbeck	   and	   the	   Mayo	   Clinic	   scientists	   alike.	   In	   addition	   to	   this	  problem	   of	   creating	   opportunities	   for	   challenge,	   Stengers	   further	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  collaborate	  with	  industry,	  academic	  scientists	  must	  submit	  to	  common	  goals	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  their	  own	  scientific	  aspirations	   (ibid.).	  My	   analysis	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   support	   this	   idea	  either.	   In	   fact,	   it	   suggests	   that	   common	  goals	   are	  not	   as	   crucial	   for	  scientific	   collaboration	   as	   often	   assumed.	   Collaborators	   can	   make	  bonds	  that	  are	  not	  based	  on	  similarity,	  but	  make	  room	  for	  diverging	  interests	  and	  aspirations.	  This	  suggests	  that	  we	  start	  to	  think	  about	  science-­‐industry	   relations	   in	   terms	  of	  divergence	  and	  creativity	   ra-­‐ther	   than	   in	   terms	  of	  convergence	  and	  threat.	  As	  also	  suggested	  by	  Winthereik	   (Withereik	   2011:	   81),	   we	   might	   direct	   our	   attention	  towards	   the	   particular	   “objects	   of	   collaboration”	   that	   create	   subtle	  connection	  points	  between	  collaborators	  without	  eliminating	  differ-­‐ence.	   In	   addition,	   rather	   than	   drawing	   a	   general	   picture,	   this	   ap-­‐proach	   would	   open	   up	   for	   accounts	   of	   the	   particular	   implications	  and	  pitfalls	  of	  science-­‐industry	  collaborations.	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